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RECALLING THE LIST-BEFORE-LAST: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
Donald LAMING1 
RÉSUMÉ – Mémorisation et restitution de l’avant-dernière liste : un conte moral 
Une question non résolue dans le domaine de la recherche sur la mémoire est la suivante : comment se 
déclenche un souvenir libre ? On a cité une expérience de Shiffrin [1970], où les participants doivent se 
remémorer l’avant-dernière liste, comme preuve que la récupération dans les expériences de rappel libre 
est de quelque manière provoquée par un signal. L’autre possibilité serait que la récupération soit 
spontanée et que les mots rappelés soient choisis rétrospectivement après récupération. Cet article 
illustre la différence entre les deux hypothèses et compare les données de Shiffrin à celles de Murdock & 
Okada [1970] et à trois autres expériences, pour soutenir que le taux de souvenirs de l’avant-dernière 
liste n’est pas plus grand que ce que l’on attendrait d’une récupération spontanée qui prend 
potentiellement en compte toutes les listes précédentes. Le nombre des intrusions, quand le souvenir ne 
doit porter que sur la liste fondamentale, corrigé par l’estimation de la proportion des récupérations 
superflues supprimées, suffit à expliquer le nombre des mots retrouvés de l’avant-dernière liste. 
MOTS CLÉS – Expérience de Shiffrin, Mémoire, Rappel libre, Restitution, Souvenir de l’avant-
dernière liste 
ABSTRACT – An unresolved question in memory research is: What cues free recall? An 
experiment by Shiffrin [1970], in which participants were instructed to recall the list-before-last, has 
been cited as evidence that retrieval in free recall experiments is (somehow) cued. The alternative is that 
retrieval is spontaneous and the words recalled are selected only in retrospect, after they have been 
retrieved. This article illustrates the difference between these two hypotheses and then compares 
Shiffrin’s published data with data from Murdock & Okada [1970], and with three other experiments, to 
argue that the rate of recall from the list-before-last is no greater than one should expect from a 
spontaneous retrieval that (potentially) addresses all preceding lists. The number of intrusions, when 
recall is requested from the ultimate list, corrected by an estimate of the proportion of unwanted 
retrievals that are suppressed, is sufficient to account for the number of words recalled from the list-
before-last. 
KEYWORDS – Free recall, Memory, Recalling the list-before-last, Retrieval, Shiffrin’s 
experiment 
1. INTRODUCTION 
These days reviewers increasingly tend to sign their reviews. A signed review signifies 
a conscientious evaluation of the paper submitted and a reviewer who is prepared to 
justify his or her comments. But there is one circumstance in which a reviewer does 
well to preserve anonymity. 
                                                            
1 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB (Great 
Britain), drjl@hermes.cam.ac.uk. 
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I submitted a paper on inter-recall times in free recall to the Psychological 
Review. My analysis of latencies was based on the assumption that retrieval from 
memory was spontaneous; that is, each memory trace has its individual probability of 
retrieval and pops up in memory in a Poisson process with precisely that density. A cue 
(if one may still call it a “cue”) acts only in retrospect to identify the material required 
after it has been retrieved. This provided a simple basis for calculating the waiting time 
until the first of those words, not yet recalled, was retrieved. 
However, one anonymous reviewer objected: 
…the attempt is to do away with the notion that free recall is cued at all. I 
don't think that can reasonably work. For instance, in the Shiffrin [1970] 
recall list N-1 paradigm, something has to be focusing participants on the list 
before last. If it was purely about accessibility relative [sic] based on 
temporal order then intrusions of the Nth list would have been catastrophic. 
In the summary by the action editor this became: 
… Shiffrin [1970] showed that subjects given successive lists can selectively 
recall items from the next-to-last list if cued to do so (without having to first 
take the time to recall items from the most recent list). 
The argument below first recounts Shiffrin’s [1970] experiment and explains the 
issue at stake. A subsequent section, then compares Shiffrin’s experiment with four 
others of similar design, to demonstrate just how catastrophic intrusions from the Nth list 
would be. 
2. TWO HYPOTHESES 
Shiffrin [1970] showed his participants a series of lists of either 5 or 20 words. The 
words were presented visually for 1 s each, with one minute allowed for recall. After 
each list (except the first) participants were asked to recall words from the last list but 
one (that is, from list N–1). The schedule of list lengths was arranged to provide equal 
numbers of lists of lengths 5 and 20 (as list N–1) followed by equal numbers of lists of 
lengths 5 and 20 (as list N). Shiffrin argued that failure to recall resulted from a failure 
of memory search, not from any degradation of the memory trace, because the 
probability of recall depended only on the length of list N–1, and not on the length of 
the intervening list N. This invokes the unspoken assumption that the loss of memory 
with lapse of time is due to degradation of that which has been stored and that ‘memory 
search’ is independent of time since presentation. 
The two alternative hypotheses of interest here are unrelated to Shiffrin’s 
conclusion, but closely related to his data. The first hypothesis says that memory search 
is actuated by some cue (unidentified) that specifically retrieves words from the list-
before-last; the second says that words are retrieved spontaneously and output only if 
they are judged to come from the list-before-last, ‘memory search’ acting in retrospect 
after candidate words have been retrieved. 
To illustrate these two opposed hypotheses, Figure 1 presents the data from two 
successive trials (by the same participant) in an experiment by Brodie and Murdock 
(1977, Expt 1; there is no comparable data available from Shiffrin’s experiment). 
Eighteen words were presented on a memory drum at 1.25 s/word. Each number in the 
figure is the serial position of a word in the list. The numbers in inverse contrast denote 
the presentation of each successive word. The other numbers denote the overt rehearsal 
or recall of a word already presented. ‘Int’ denotes an intrusion, a word that was not in 
the list just presented. 
RECALLING THE LIST-BEFORE-LAST: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
  
63 
LIST 2 
 
Rehearsal sequence coded by serial position in the stimulus list: 
                  
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 2 5 1 6 4 7 5 8 6 9 4 
                 Begin 
recall 10 2 11 9 12 10 13 12 14 13 15 14 16 17 15 18 18 
                 
Recall sequence, again coded by serial position: 
                  
1 15 18 14               
LIST 3 
 
Rehearsal sequence coded by serial position in the stimulus list: 
                  
1 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6 5 7 6 8 7 9 8 10 
                Begin 
recall 9 11 10 12 13 11 14 12 13 15 14 16 17 17 18 18 
                
Recall sequence, again coded by serial position: 
                  
4 3 9 17 Int Int             
 
FIGURE 1. Sample data for two successive trials from an experiment 
by Brodie and Murdock [1977, Expt 1]. 
Words are denoted by serial position within the list. The numbers in inverse contrast denote 
the presentation of each successive word; other numbers denote overt 
rehearsals or recalls. ‘Int’ denotes a word that was not in the list just presented. 
Ordinarily, in free recall experiments, each recall addresses the immediately 
preceding list (and rehearsals during its presentation). In Shiffrin’s procedure, on the 
other hand, the recall following List 3 would have addressed List 2. The anonymous 
reviewer envisaged that at the recall following List 3 the instruction to recall the list-
before-last would have directed retrieval specifically to List 2, and that unwanted 
retrievals from List 3 would have been much fewer in number than if List 3 had been 
addressed directly in the ordinary way. Spontaneous retrieval, on the other hand, 
supposes that at the recall following List 3, words would have been retrieved from both 
lists and, moreover, that the pattern of that retrieval would have been unchanged by the 
instruction to recall the list-before-last. That instruction merely means that words from 
List 3, if they are identified as such, are suppressed rather than being recalled. 
3. INTRUSIONS IN FREE RECALL 
Since Shiffrin’s paper amounted to two pages only in Science, only recalls from list N–1 
were reported. For intrusions from list N I rely on comparison with an experiment by 
Murdock & Okada [1970]. Murdock and Okada also presented lists of 20 words, again 
visually at one word per s, followed by one minute for recall. There is therefore an exact 
comparison between lists of length 20 followed by another list of length 20 in Shiffrin’s 
Experiment 1 (in which the recall period was always one minute) and data from 
Murdock & Okada [1970], specifically for lists presented at one word per s, but with 
recall requested from the last-presented list2. In the Murdock and Okada data (the raw 
                                                            
2 The data from the other conditions in Shiffrin’s Experiment 1 and from his other two experiments are 
very similar, so that the selection of this particular condition, for the sake of exact comparison, does not 
gloss over any important differences. 
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data are available for analysis) it is possible to distinguish between original recalls, 
repetitions and intrusions, and the average numbers per list for each category of 
response in these two experiments are set out in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Mean numbers of responses and estimated retrievals per list 
in the experiments by Shiffrin [1970] and Murdock and Okada [1970] 
Category of response Shiffrin (1970) Murdock & Okada (1970) 
 Responses Responses Estimated retrievals 
Original recalls (List N)  6.5  
Repetitions (List N)  0.23 1.2 3 
Original recalls (List N–1) or 
Intrusions (List N) 
2.8 0.63 4.23 
Total  7.3  
Note Data from Shiffrin [1970] and Murdock and Okada [1970]. 
Murdock & Okada’s 36 participants (1 word/s presentations only) made an 
average of 7.3 responses per list. Of that 7.3, 6.5 were original recalls, 0.2 were 
repetitions and 0.6 intrusions. However, it is known that once a word has been recalled, 
its probability of a second recall is much reduced, implying that, while it may be 
retrieved a second time, if that retrieval is identified as a repetition, it is suppressed. 
Table 2 sets out the data from Murdock & Okada (1970, 1 word/s). Each row 
categorises recalls in the kth output position. Each recall is either a repetition of a recall 
originally output somewhere in 1st to (k–1)th position or is an original recall (i.e., not a 
repetition). A quick visual examination reveals that the number of repetitions is much 
less than the number of original recalls, but this is complicated by the fact that one 
cannot have a repetition until the word that is repeated has already been recalled. The 
Appendix sets out a randomisation test which compares the frequency of repetitions 
with the frequency of original recalls, circumventing the difficulty that a repetition 
cannot occur until the original recall that is being repeated has itself been uttered and 
that repetition frequencies are necessarily lower on that account4. The same procedure 
can be utilised to estimate the median number of retrievals prior to suppression of recall 
by asking what number of repetitions would equate to a significance level of 0.5. That 
median (895 compared with 131 repeated recalls) suggests an average (Table 1) of 1.2 
repeated retrievals per list. That is, about six repeated retrievals out of seven
3
 are 
estimated to have been suppressed. Applying the same rate of suppression to intrusions 
(words from previous lists which, again, were not required to be recalled) suggests that 
the 0.6 per list that were recorded resulted from about 4.2 retrievals. The immediately 
preceding list would have been the principal source of those 4.2 intrusive retrievals. 
                                                            
3 The statistics in Table 1 have been rounded to 1 d.p. To 3 d.p. the statistics are 0.182, 1.243, 0.611, 
4.175. 
4 The significance level attaching to the hypothesis that the probability of repetition in Table 2 is not 
reduced is calculated by this procedure to be exp(-967.9). 
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TABLE 2. Numbers of repetitions as a function of output position in the recall sequence 
and of output position of the potential source. 
Output position 
of repetition 
Original 
recall 
Output position of original recall Total 
recalls 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
2nd 719 0            719 
3rd 715 0 0           715 
4th 705 1 0 0          706 
5th 649 2 5 0 0         656 
6th 548 10 8 5 1 0        572 
7th 424 10 7 8 2 0 0       451 
8th 283 6 11 5 5 0 0 0      310 
9th 187 5 3 5 1 3 1 0 0     205 
10th 99 6 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0    115 
11th 52 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0   57 
12th 23 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  26 
13th 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Note Data from Murdock and Okada [1970]. 
Murdock & Okada’s participants averaged 7.3 recalls per list, and are estimated to 
have averaged 11.9 retrievals. The idea that Shiffrin’s participants averaged only 2.8 
retrievals in the same period of time (1 min) is simply implausible; there must have 
been intrusions, not reported because anything other than recalls from list N–1 was 
irrelevant to Shiffrin’s purpose in writing. Transposing the Murdock and Okada 
averages to Shiffrin’s experiment suggests about 7.7 retrievals (6.5 + 1.2, including 
repetitions) from the last list presented. Since in terms of Shiffrin’s task these were 
intrusions, they would have been suppressed, if recognised as such by the participant, 
and simply not reported (by the experimenter) otherwise. A comparison of the 2.8 
original recalls from list N–1 with the 4.2 intrusive retrievals estimated from the 
Murdock & Okada data provides no ground for proposing an enhanced retrieval of 
words from list N–1. Shiffrin’s tally is about what one would expect if retrieval from 
memory was spontaneous, indifferently from list N and listN–1. 
REPLICATIONS OF SHIFFRIN’S EXPERIMENT 
Ward & Tan [2004] have replicated Shiffrin’s experiment and his result. They have also 
repeated the experiment with 4 s between successive words and instructions to rehearse 
aloud. Participants do rehearse the words from the list (N–1) that is to be recalled and, 
analysis of rehearsals in free recall [Laming, 2006, 2008] shows that the subsequent 
recall of rehearsed words is enhanced. Analysis of the recall sequences from Murdock 
& Okada [1970; see Laming, 2010] indicates some small level of rehearsal even at 1 
word/s, so this is a contributory factor in both the experiments by Shiffrin [1970] and 
Murdock & Okada [1970]. Jang & Huber [2008, Expt 2] have also repeated Shiffrin’s 
experiment (with slightly different design parameters) and have shown that there are 
indeed recalls from the intervening list, notwithstanding an instruction to suppress such 
recalls. Very recently Unsworth, Spillers & Brewer [2012] have replicated Shiffrin’s 
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experiment in some detail and confirmed his results. They reported intrusions from both 
the intervening List N and from the preceding List N–2, with relatively more intrusions 
from List N when that list was of length 20 rather than 5. The proportion recalled from 
List N–1 was substantially reduced below the proportion obtained from a control list 
(i.e., List N with instruction to recall the list just presented) and the mean latency was 
increased in proportion. These results are all consistent with the idea that the pattern of 
retrieval is unchanged by the instruction to recall the list-before-last; only the selection 
of retrievals for output is different. 
The key to this reassessment of Shiffrin’s [1970] data is that recall of the list-
before-last produces notably fewer original recalls than recall of the ultimate list. 
Harbison, Dougherty, Davelaar & Fayyad [2009] have reported a related experiment 
with four 8-item lists presented in succession, each list accompanied by a cue word. 
After a second presentation of the four lists, participants were asked to retrieve one list 
at a time, the designated list being indicated by its cue word. Participants were, indeed, 
able to recall some words from the list four places back in the order, but only averaged 
two words out of 8. 
Ward & Tan [2004, p. 1197] commented: 
… it becomes apparent that the participants (in Shiffrin [1970]) found the 
task exceedingly difficult… 
I question whether this was actually so. To be sure, the participants recalled between 
one and three items from the TBR lists, but whether that represents an experienced 
difficulty, or simply a natural rate of retrieval indifferently from all preceding lists, is 
unclear. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The ultimate question here concerns the mechanics of retrieval. Is retrieval from 
memory effected by a cue or is it spontaneous, with a cue (if one may still call it a 
“cue”) acting only in retrospect to identify the material required after it has been 
retrieved? The process of retrieval is not observable, so the answer to this question must 
depend on how well the alternative answers accommodate experimental findings. 
The reviewer for the Psychological Review mistakenly equated retrieval with 
actual recall. But we know that participants retrieve some words that they do not utter in 
recall; first, because they tell us so and, second, because the rehearsal of a word 
increases its likelihood of subsequent recall, while actual recall has the opposite effect 
(Table 2). The inference has to be that participants retrieve some words a second or 
third time (1.2 per list in Murdock and Okada [1970]), but do not utter them because 
they are identified as ‘already recalled’. This means that retrieval is also unobservable. 
It may be inferred from recall, but recall does not identify all retrievals. 
It is widely supposed that retrieval from memory is cued. No cue, no retrieval. 
This sits well with the analysis of data from recognition memory, paired associates, and 
serial recall, but free recall presents a problem. Fifty years of intensive research has 
failed to discover an operative cue. It is common to propose a search of relevant items 
in memory [Anderson & Bower, 1972; Howard & Kahana, 2002; Mensink & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1980]. As Unsworth, Spillers & Brewer 
[2012] have recently put it: 
In such models it is assumed that the search set is determined, in part, by the 
match between context stored in the items and the context present during 
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retrieval such that the greater the overlap between the two, the more likely an 
item has in being included in the search set and subsequently recalled [e.g., 
Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988]. Thus context at retrieval acts as the primary 
cue and dictates the extent to which relevant items will be recalled 
[Unsworth, Spillers & Brewer, 2012, p. 1]. 
This sketch pays lip service to the idea of cued retrieval, but sounds suspiciously 
like selection of relevant material (“context at retrieval acts as the primary cue”) after it 
has been retrieved. In truth, so long as only frequencies of recalls are available as data, 
there is no way of distinguishing between a cue eliciting retrieval directly and a cue 
acting in retrospect to select relevant material after it has been retrieved; except… 
… in free recall experiments in which the participants have rehearsed aloud, 
extrapolation of the pattern of rehearsal beyond the point at which recall is requested 
predicts the subsequent sequence of recalls with an interesting level of accuracy 
[Laming, 2006, 2008]5. Those predictions assume that stimulus presentations and 
previous rehearsals are retrieved at random (i.e., spontaneously), subject to a decreasing 
probability (recency effect). 
It is logically possible that some material is cued (in e.g., recognition memory, 
paired associates, and serial recall) and other material (in free recall) is retrieved 
spontaneously in the absence of an effective cue. But this is to model the experiment, 
rather than memory. Memory does not start up at the beginning of an experiment; it is 
already up and running before ever the participant gets to the experimental chamber. An 
experiment on memory is therefore an imposition on an already ongoing process. Recall 
is a function of the experiment – different experiments deliver different kinds of data – 
but retrieval belongs to the underlying process and, as a metatheoretic principle, should 
be effected in the same manner for all experimental paradigms. 
There seems, nevertheless, to be a wide-spread belief that retrieval from memory 
is cued. But a reviewer cannot object purely on the basis of belief. There has to be some 
evidence. Hence,  
… in the Shiffrin [1970] recall list N-1 paradigm, something has to be 
focusing participants on the list before last. If it was purely about 
accessibility relative [sic] based on temporal order then intrusions of the Nth 
list would have been catastrophic. 
5. APPENDIX 
A RANDOMISATION TEST OF THE SUPPRESSION OF REPEATED RECALLS6 
Suppose there are N (= 720) lists of recalls and, amongst those lists, r occurrences of 
some word W. Assuming those occurrences to be labelled (so that different recalls of W 
are distinguishable), there are N r  different possible arrangements of the r recalls 
amongst the N lists. Let m be the number of recall lists containing at least one recall of 
W; then (r-m) of the r recalls are repetitions. 
If there is no suppression of a response that has already been uttered, then all N r  
arrangements are equally probable; but if, once word W has been recalled, the 
probability of its being uttered a second time in the same list is reduced, then the 
                                                            
5 The predictions are not exact because individual words are commonly rehearsed several times during 
presentation and one cannot know which particular rehearsal is the source of the present recall. 
6 From Laming, D. Failure to recall. Psychological Review, 116(1), p. 157–186, 2009, APA. Adapted 
with permission. 
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number of repetitions (r-m) will be less than would otherwise occur by chance and the 
number m of lists containing at least one recall of W will be increased. The test which 
follows is based on a calculation of the chance probability that m or more of the N lists 
contain at least one of the r recalls of W under the null hypothesis that there is no 
suppression of repeated recalls. 
Let A
m
(r,N )  be the number of arrangements in which exactly m lists are 
occupied. Any such arrangement can be obtained by adding an rth recall of W to an 
existing arrangement of (r-1) recalls. A total of m lists will be occupied by r recalls if 
either the rth recall is added to one of m lists already occupied by r-1 recalls or if it is 
added to one of the (N-m+1) lists left unoccupied in an arrangement of r-1 recalls in m-1 
lists. Hence 
A
m
(r,N ) =mA
m
(r !1,N )+ (N !m+1)A
m!1(r !1,N )  (A1) 
This recurrence relation is satisfied by 
A
m
(r,N ) =
N
m
!
"
#
$
%
&   ('1)k
k=0
m
(  m
k
!
"
#
$
%
&  (m' k)r  (A2) 
a result which can be checked by substitution in Equation A1. 
Under the hypothesis that there is no suppression of repeated recalls, all Nr 
arrangements are equally probable, and the probability p
m
(r,N )  that exactly m lists are 
occupied (i.e., that there are exactly r-m repetitions of W) is equal to N !rA
m
(r,N ) . The 
tail probability of r-m or fewer repetitions in r recalls is therefore 
 pk
k=m
r
! (r,N ) =  N "r
k=m
r
! Ak (r,N )  (A3) 
For computational purposes it is convenient to note that the number of 
arrangements of r recalls in exactly m out of N lists is equal to the number of ways of 
selecting the m lists (N!/m!(N-m)!) times the number of ways of arranging the r recalls 
within the m lists such that every list is occupied. This second factor is independent of 
N. Therefore put 
pm (r,N ) = N
!r
Am (r,N ) = N
!r
(N )m f (r,m)  (A4) 
where f(r, m) is independent of N. After substitution in Equation A1, 
f (r,m) =mf (r !1,m)+ f (r !1,  m!1)  (A5) 
The quantity f(r, m) is the number of ways of assigning r distinct recalls to m lists, 
such that every list is occupied, divided by m!. It is equal to 1 if either m = r or m = 1. 
Values for other integer arguments are most easily calculated by iteration from Equation 
A5, the pm(r, N) from Equation A4, and the tail probabilities (A3) by summation of the 
pm(r, N). 
RECALLING THE LIST-BEFORE-LAST: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
  
69 
BIBLIOGRAPHIE 
ANDERSON J. R., BOWER G. H. (1972). “Recognition and retrieval processes in free recall”, Psychological 
Review 79, p. 97-123. 
BRODIE D.A., MURDOCK B.B. Jr. (1977), “Effect of presentation time on nominal and functional serial-
position curves of free recall”, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 16(2), p. 185–200. 
HARBISON J.I., DOUGHERTY M.R., DAVELAAR E.J., FAYYAD B. (2009), “On the lawfulness of the decision to 
terminate memory search”, Cognition 111(3), p. 397-402. 
HOWARD M.W., KAHANA M.J. (2002), “A distributed representation of temporal context”, Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology 46, p. 269-299. 
JANG Y., HUBER D.E. (2008), “Context retrieval and context change in free recall: Recalling from long-
term memory drives list isolation”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 34(1), p. 112-127. 
LAMING D. (2006), “Predicting free recalls”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 32(5), p. 1146–1163. 
LAMING D. (2008), “An improved algorithm for predicting free recalls”, Cognitive Psychology 57(3),  
p. 179-219. 
LAMING D. (2009), “Failure to recall”, Psychological Review 116(1), p. 157-186. 
LAMING D. (2010), “Serial position curves in free recall”, Psychological Review 117(1), p. 93-133. 
MENSINK G., RAAIJMAKERS J.G.W. (1988), “A model for interference and forgetting”, Psychological 
Review 95, p. 434-455. 
MURDOCK B.B. Jr., OKADA R. (1970), “Interresponse times in single-trial free recall”, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 86(2), p. 263-267. 
RAAIJMAKERS J.G.W., SHIFFRIN R.M. (1980), “SAM: A theory of probabilistic search of associative 
memory”, in G. Bower (ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, vol. 14, New York (NY), 
Academic Press. 
SHIFFRIN R.M. (1970), “Forgetting: Trace erosion or retrieval failure”, Science 168(3939), p. 1601-1603. 
UNSWORTH N., SPILLERS G.J., BREWER G.A. (2012), “Evidence for noisy contextual search: Examining the 
dynamics of list-before-last recall”, Memory 20(1), p. 1-13. 
WARD G., TAN L. (2004), “The effect of the length of to-be-remembered lists and intervening lists on free 
recall: A reexamination using overt rehearsal”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition 30(6), p. 1196-1210. 
